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POINTS OF VIEW
SYNAPOMORPHY, PARSIMONY, AND EVIDENCE
Duncan (1984: 703) maintained that "directed character compatibility [clique] analysis is equivalent
to Hennig's method" and that Farris, Kluge and Eckardt (1970) had misrepresented Hennig's views
by proposing a connection between Hennig's method and parsimony. As the basis for that charge he
claimed (p. 70 I) that Farris, Kluge and Eckardt had changed Hennig's definition of "synapomorphy
to include shared non-uniquely derived characters."
To justify his accusation Duncan needed to show that Hennig never regarded sharing ofnon-unique
derivations as synapomorphy, and he attempted to do this by quotations from Hennig (1966). We
demonstrated in our earlier reply (Farris and Kluge, 1985) that Duncan's interpretation of those
passages was mistaken, since Hennig had used non-uniquely derived traits as synapomorphies of
several groups. Hennig (1983), for example, lists endothermy-which originated independently in
birds and mammals-as a synapomorphy of each of those groups.
In his new comments Duncan (1986) does not deny that Hennig treated endothermy in this way,
but he does persist in maintaining that parsimony analysis applies synapomorphy in a non-Hennigian
sense. A Hennigian synapomorphy, according to Duncan, can only be "a uniquely derived character
state within the group being analyzed" (emphasis Duncan's). What began as the matter of Hennig's
concept ofsynapomorphy seems to have become the issue of Duncan's meaning of "unique."
Duncan explains his usage in his discussion of his fig. 2. In that artificial example (A, B, C) and (D,
E, F) are sister groups, and a derived trait 7 is present in A, B, and C, but also in F. "According to
Hennig's method," Duncan writes, trait 7 "does not constitute a synapomorphy of A, B, and C. This
is an example, in Hennig's sense, of convergence." Duncan's reason for that conclusion is that trait
7 is not unique to A-e within the inclusive group A-F. Of the subgroups of the most inclusive group
in the same figure Duncan comments, "The characters that define each of these four ingroups are
unique to it with respect to other monophyletic ingroups that comprise [that most inclusive group]."
We presume that by defining characters Duncan means synapomorphies.
The other characters of that figure are either literally uniquely derived (traits I, 2, 3, 5, 6) or show
convergence only between entirely separate groups (trait 4). Their interpretation as synapomorphies
is acceptable to Duncan as well as parsimonious, so that their treatment is not relevant to the difference
between the two methods. A parsimonious interpretation of trait 7 on Duncan's tree would apply that
state as a synapomorphy ofA-e, and so Duncan's reason for rejecting this character as a synapomorphy
does bear on the difference between parsimony and Duncan's procedure.
Duncan writes that his concept is applied in Hennig's (1981) discussion of neoptery (the ability of
insects to flex the wings back over the abdomen) and that his method is consistent with Hennig's
(1983) treatment of chordates. But he offers neither quotations from those works nor any other
discussion of them in support of his contentions, and consideration of Hennig's studies does not bear
out Duncan's claims.
In Hennig's (1983) treatment of chordate phylogeny Amniota is composed of four groups, Lepi-
dosauria, Testudines, Archosauromorpha, and Mammalia. Archosauromorpha is divided into Croc-
odilia and Aves. Hennig's own arrangement leaves Amniota divided into these four groups by an
unresolved quadrifurcation, although he discusses two other possible resolutions. In one, Mammalia
comprises the sister group of all other Amniota (Sauropsida). In the other, Testudines is the sister
group of all other Amniota (Euamniota).
Hennig lists endothermy as a synapomorphy of Mammalia, and also as one of Aves. In Hennig's
arrangement Mammalia is included in Amniota, and endothermy is not unique to Mammalia within
Amniota, as the trait occurs also in some Archosauromorpha. The same is true if Amniota is divided
into Mammalia and Sauropsida. IfAmniota is divided into Testudines and Euamniota, then Mammalia
is included in Euamniota, but endothermy is not unique to Mammalia within Euamniota.
Hennig's use ofendothermy as a synapomorphy ofMammalia thus directly contradicts the criterion
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that Duncan uses to rule out trait 7 as a synapomorphy. In particular, while this similarity between
birds and mammals is certainly convergence, the similarity within mammals-or birds-is instead
synapomorphy. Duncan's criterion would imply illogically that, because endothermy has developed
in birds, that similarity is convergent among mammals. Duncan's trait 7, likewise, does indeed show
convergence between (A, B, C) and F, but the similarity in that trait within (A, B, C) is nonetheless
applicable as synapomorphy.
Hennig's treatment of other characters for these taxa leads to the same conclusion. Hennig (1983:
145) lists thecodont dentition as a synapomorphy of Archosauromorpha, even though he notes that
it is convergently developed in Mammalia, and even though teeth are lost in some Archosauromorpha.
On page 146 he lists bipedalism as a synapomorphy of the same group, although that trait is also
developed in some Mammalia and secondarily lost in many Archosauromorpha. On page 135 he lists
loss of teeth as a synapomorphy of Testudines, although that loss occurs also in Aves, as well as in
other groups. Hennig, then, certainly does not restrict synapomorphy to similarity in traits that are
uniquely derived in Duncan's sense.
According to Hennig (1981: 23-24,147-155,157) neoptery developed in two groups of insects,
Neoptera and Megasecoptera. Hennig applied neoptery as a synapomorphy of Neoptera despite the
independent origin ofthat trait elsewhere and despite the loss ofwings in several subgroups ofNeoptera.
Nothing in Hennig's discussion of neoptery resembles Duncan's explanation of why trait 7 is not a
synapomorphy, and Hennig's treatment of this character does not conform to Duncan's claim.
In Hennig's arrangement Pterygota is divided into two sister groups, Paleoptera and Neoptera.
Hennig assigns Megasecoptera to Paleodictyoptera but takes no definite position on the placement of
the latter, entirely fossil group beyond regarding it as belonging to Pterygota but not Neoptera, If, as
is usually done, Paleodictyoptera is assigned to Paleoptera, then neoptery would not be unique to
Neoptera within Pterygota, and this case would contradict Duncan's criterion.
It might be, however, that Paleodictyoptera is the sister group of all other Pterygota. In that event
applying neoptery as a synapomorphy ofNeoptera would not contradict Duncan's criterion, since that
trait would be unique to Neoptera within the monophyletic group Neoptera + Paleoptera. But then
neoptery would have arisen in two separate groups, like trait 4 ofDuncan's fig.2, and so would provide
no basis for distinguishing between parsimony and Duncan's method.
Depending on the placement of Megasecoptera, then, Hennig's use ofneoptery as a synapomorphy
of Neoptera either directly contradicts Duncan's criterion, or else offers no grounds for preferring
Duncan's method over parsimony. That Hennig arrives at a definite conclusion on the use of that
trait as a synapomorphy without establishing the position of Megasecoptera, furthermore, by itself
implies that Hennig's criterion differs from Duncan's, since with Duncan's method that conclusion
would have to depend on whether Megasecoptera is assigned to Paleoptera.
Other parts of Hennig's study of insect phylogeny also refute Duncan's position. In Hennig's ar-
rangement Diplura is the sister group of Protura + Collembola. Hennig (1981: Hi2) lists absence of
compound eyes among the "derived characters that indicate that the Diplura are monophyletic" and
also (p. 104) as a derived character of Protura. Hennig divides Neoptera into Plecoptera, Paurome-
tabola, Paraneoptera, and Holometabola. He lists the tracheal gills of the larvae and possession of
just three tarsal segments among the derived characters of Plecoptera (p. 163). Tracheal gills are also
a derived character of Megaloptera (p. 287) in Paraneoptera. Tarsi of three segments are also among
the derived characters of Embioptera (p. 181) in Paurometabola. Paurometabola consists of the sister
groups Embioptera and Orthoperomorpha. Lack of ocelli is a derived feature of Embioptera (p. 181)
and of both Notoptera (p. 184) and Dermaptera (p. 186) in Orthopteromorpha. None of these derived
characters is unique to its group within the more inclusive group and so each of them contradicts
Duncan's criterion.
No part ofDuncan's discussion addresses these cases or the problems that they raise for his position,
and indeed nothing in his paper suggests that Duncan has even troubled himself to learn how Hennig
classifies either chordates or insects. It would appear that Duncan has proceeded not by the study of
Hennig's work, but instead simply by attributing to Hennig whatever ideas seem necessary to support
Duncan's preference for cliques.
Duncan (1984: 704) proposed that methods of phylogenetic analysis should be selected not for
conformity to Hennig's principles, but "according to the appropriate evolutionary model." We replied
that proceeding in that way leads to a vicious circle. Such models are theories on the course ofevolution,
and to justify them empirically would require methods of phylogenetic inference. If those methods
might be obtained only from models, then nothing ever could have been learned about evolution.
But this does not mean that there is no way of arriving at a phylogenetic method. Hypotheses of
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phylogenetic relationship, like all scientific theories, are to be judged by their ability to explain relevant
observations. Genealogical hypotheses are potentially able to account for observed points of similarity
among organisms as the result of inheritance from a common ancestor.
A genealogy that is consistent with a single origin of some trait is able to account for all similarities
in that trait as inheritance. A genealogy that divides the bearers of a trait into two groups so that it
requires two origins of that feature cannot account for the similarity between those groups as inher-
itance, but it is still able to explain the similarity within each of those groups. Another genealogy that
split one of those groups, so requiring three origins of the trait, could account for still fewer of the
similarities in that feature.
Each additional requirement for a separate origin of a feature reduces the explanatory power of a
theory of phylogenetic relationship. To identify the genealogical hypothesis best able to explain ob-
served similarities, then, it is necessary only to find the tree that minimizes requirements for inde-
pendent origins, the most parsimonious tree. If some features are taken to provide more reliable
indications of kinship than do others, it will naturally be suitable to minimize a weighted total of
independent origins, but there is no need to pursue the subject of weighting here.
This argument has arrived at the parsimony criterion directly from principles that are fundamental
to science in general, but it can be related to Hennig's ideas as well. Most pertinent are Hennig's
auxiliary principle and what we have called (Farris and Kluge, 1979) his weight of evidence principle.
The first of these is most succinctly stated by Hennig (1984: 609):
"It must be recognized as a principle of inquiry for the practice of phylogenetic systematics that
agreement in characters must be interpreted as synapomorphy as long as there are no grounds for
suspecting its origin to be symplesiomorphy or convergence."
This is also discussed by Hennig (1966: 121-122). The weight of evidence principle is stated by Hennig
(cf.1966: 121) as
"The more characters certainly interpretable as apomorphous (not characters in general) that are
present in a number of different species, the better founded is the assumption that these species form
a monophyletic group."
This is not the text as it stands in the English edition. As Farris, Kluge and Eckardt (1970) showed
from the original German, the words "certainly" and "character" were accidentally transposed in the
translation.
The first of these precepts requires that similarities be applied as synapomorphies whenever possible,
while the second points out that the best founded conclusions are those in which as many similarities
as possible have been so applied. Since similarity is synapomorphy only when it is the result of
inheritance from a common ancestor, these principles lead to parsimony in just the same way as does
the concept of explanatory power.
On a tree consistent with a single derivation of some trait, all the similarities in that trait can be
applied as synapomorphy. (A feature already present at the root of the tree-a plesiomorphy-is then
applied as a synapornorphy at a more inclusive level of grouping, just as one would wish.) If a tree
requires separate derivations ofa trait in two or more groups, then the similarity in that trait between
those groups cannot be applied as synapomorphy, but the similarity within the groups still can be
applied, and each additional requirement for an independent origin reduces the similarities that can
be applied as synapomorphy.
This derivation is straightforward, but the conclusion can nonetheless be reached more directly.
Hennig certainly regarded characters as providing evidence on genealogical relationships, and there
is a necessary connection between the concepts of evidence and of explanation. An observation is said
to provide evidence favoring a first hypothesis over a second precisely when the first is the better able
to explain the observation. Since the parsimony criterion measures explanatory ability, the idea that
characters provide evidence on genealogy in itself leads to the parsimony criterion.
While the basis of this conclusion is clear, the finding may seem startling. Surely, one might think,
any method that uses characters treats them as evidence. The resolution of this point is related to
Duncan's appeal to models. Some methods proposed for phylogenetic inference are indeed based on
models. It is often attempted, for example, to interpret phenograms as genealogies, and this is defended
by recourse to the clock model, the assumption that rates of evolution are largely the same for all
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lineages. These calculations do employ characters, but they do not use only characters; instead they
treat the supposition of rate constancy as if it, too, were evidence.
Such appeal to supposition is fundamentally antiscientific in character. If the assumption of rate
constancy is used to justify a phenogram as a genealogy, and if the phenogram requires many more
origins of traits than does the parsimonious tree, then the assumption has led to loss of explanatory
power. If rate constancy were treated as a scientific theory-as it should be-then the inferior ability
ofthe phenogram to explain observed similarities should be taken as evidence against the clock model.
But the users of such methods typically insist instead that the phenogram must be accepted because
ofthe clock assumption, and so they rely on supposition rather than evidence as a guide to phylogenetic
kinship.
Felsenstein's (1981) statistical defense ofcliques epitomizes this attitude on models. He derives that
method from the premise that every character that is not uniquely derived has changed so frequently
that it shows no correlation whatever with genealogical relationships. He admits that this assumption
is unrealistic, but that confession rather understates the case. As Farris (1983, 1985) has observed, if
characters behaved in that way, then the independent loss of limbs in snakes and apodans would have
the remarkable implication that each species (or generation, for that matter) of snakes has lost its
limbs independently. While the statistical view of inference has undisputed merits in many applications,
Felsenstein's own appeal to it amounts to no more than insisting that phylogenetic conclusions should
be based on ludicrous suppositions.
Farris (1983) has pointed out that it seems impossible to derive clique methods without some such
assumption as Felsenstein's. The reason for this is simply that any point of derived similarity that is
not convergence does in fact indicate genealogical relationship. In clique methods any trait taken not
to be uniquely derived (either literally or "within the group being analyzed") is disregarded as a basis
for grouping, and this amounts to proceeding as if every apomorphic similarity between taxa in that
character were convergence. Churchill et al. (1985: 129) seem to have had this in mind when they
criticized clique methods as relying on the "curious notion that one instance of homoplasy renders
that character useless."
Duncan does not mention Farris' argument, but he does protest the comment by Churchill et al.
His reply, however, consists only of introducing the criterion that he uses to rule out his trait 7 as
synapomorphy. As we have already noted, the effect of that criterion is precisely to deny that the
apomorphic similarity in that character within (A, B, C) is synapomorphy, for no other reason than
that that trait arises independently in F. Duncan himself observes that that trait "shows one instance
of parallelism within [A-Fl." It seems clear, then, that Duncan's method relies on the very assumption
that he denies.
Beyond denying the implications ofhis own criterion Duncan no longer mentions models, nor does
he address our discussion of explanatory power. Despite his earlier comment he seems to have decided
to stake his defense of cliques entirely on his portrayal of Hennig's principles. In the remainder of his
present paper he again quotes parts of Hennig's (1966) discussion in an effort to support his position.
While it is already clear that Duncan has misrepresented Hennig's views, it may be worthwhile to
point out specifically why these passages do not justify Duncan's contentions.
Since Duncan claims that parsimony applies non-Hennigian synapomorphies while cliques do not,
any case used as evidence for his position must at the least show different results with the two methods.
It is well known (see Farris and Kluge, 1979; Farris, 1983) that cliques and parsimony can give different
trees only if there are multiple derivations in the data, and even then only when more than three taxa
are analyzed. Some parts of Hennig's discussion provide no opportunity for distinguishing between
cliques and parsimony for just this reason.
Hennig's (1966: 120-122) consideration of how interpretations of reversal or convergence may be
applied when characters are incongruent uses an example with only three taxa.
In both ofhis papers Duncan analogizes Hennig's (1966: 120-122) comments on incongruence with
his own discussion of his 1984 fig. I, which also involves just three taxa. But he does not deny that
more than three taxa are needed to produce different results with parsimony and with clique methods,
nor does he explain how this section of Hennig's work might nonetheless support his claim.
Hennig's (1966: 91) example of forming a tree by grouping according to synapomorphy involves
four taxa all of whose characters are literally uniquely derived.
Duncan insists that Hennig's example of page 91 illustrates "the definition of synapomorphy as a
uniquely derived character state within the group being analyzed." But one could just as well say that
it illustrates Hennig's use of parsimony, and Duncan does not deny that clique techniques can depart
from parsimony only with multiply-derived traits.
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Hennig (1966: 90) describes the apomorphous characters of a group as present only in that group.
Ifinterpreted literally, this comment would rule out all multiple derivations as synapomorphies. That
interpretation would not agree with Duncan's present position, as characters such as Duncan's trait
4 would be excluded. On page 93, however, Hennig notes that his preceding discussion (pp. 90-92)
disregards the problems raised by parallelism, convergence, and reversal. This explanation, together
with Hennig's obvious use of multiple derivations in the cases already described, makes it clear that
Hennig never intended this section as a guide to treatment of multiple derivations. Again, parsimony
and cliques may disagree only when there are multiply-derived traits.
We called attention in our earlier paper to Hennig's comment on page 93 and pointed out why
Hennig's discussion on pages 90-92 cannot support Duncan's claim. Duncan now quotes from page
90 but does not mention page 93 or attempt to rebut our observation. What rejoinders Duncan does
make to earlier discussion of this section seem at best no more than evasions of the main issue.
Churchill et al. (1985), for instance, quoted Hennig (1966: 90) to the effect that the characters of the
example on page 91 had been chosen "for simplicity." Duncan protests that Hennig's example is not
simple, carefully not mentioning that this was Hennig's own comment, and providing no amplification
of the curious view that a four-taxon problem with only unique derivations is complex.
Hennig (1966: 120) observes, "in deciding whether corresponding characters of several species are
to be regarded as synapomorphies ... we must determine whether the same character was already
present in a stem species that is common only to the bearers of the identical characters." Endothermy
in mammals is inherited from a stem species common only to mammals; the same applies to birds.
The most recent stem species common to mammals and birds did not show endothermy, nor is that
stem species common only to endotherms, as its descendants include crocodiles. Thus endothermy
is a synapomorphy of mammals, and also of birds, but the similarity between the two groups in that
trait is not synapomorphy. It may be recalled that Hennig himself (1983) applies endothermy as
synapomorphy in exactly this way.
We attributed the same meaning to this passage in our earlier paper. Duncan neither replies to our
comment nor explains how his method can be consistent with Hennig's treatment of endothermy.
Again his reactions to earlier discussion seem merely evasive. Churchill et al. (1985: 125) pointed out
that in Hennig's quoted statement, "it is the ancestor which must be uniquely shared (among the
species) and not the character." Duncan disputes this observation only by rewording it so that the
crucial "uniquely" vanishes.
Duncan (1984: 70I) attributed to Hennig's weight of evidence principle, quoted above, the meaning
"that monophyletic groups are more compelling if a congruent set of transformation series define these
groups." He used his rewording as the rationale for a criticism of parsimony, concluding from an
artificial example (his fig. 2) that "use of parsimony criteria may give cladograms that contain fewer
monophyletic groups defined by synapomorphies in Hennig's sense."
We pointed out before that Hennig's statement concerns counting apomorphies, while Duncan's
argument instead involves counting groups; that Hennig's statement makes no mention of congruence,
whence Duncan's inclusion of congruence (i.e., compatibility) in his rewording seems entirely gratui-
tous; and that Duncan reckoned only putatively unique derivations as synapomorphies. Without that
restriction, the parsimonious tree for Duncan's artificial data has both more synapomorphies and
more monophyletic groups than does Duncan's clique tree.
Duncan makes no mention whatever of the first two of these points, nor does he deny that the
parsimonious tree has more synapomorphies and groups if non-unique derivations are used as syn-
apomorphies. He only insists that Hennig would use only unique derivations. As it is clear from the
preceding examples that that claim is quite false, it is equally clear that Duncan's argument is ill-
founded.
Duncan earlier followed Felsenstein (1983a) in charging that Farris, Kluge and Eckardt (1970) made
an arbitrary choice in relating parsimony to Hennig's ideas. We noted before that Felsenstein's paper
does not even identify the purported arbitrary step in Farris, Kluge and Eckardt's reasoning. Duncan
cites nothing from Felsenstein to rebut that observation, although he does now offer an argument of
his own to support his accusation, quoting from the 1970 paper to the effect that the weight of evidence
principle does not uniquely determine a criterion for choosing among trees. Duncan's use of this
charge to support his preference for cliques rests on ignoring the difference in context between the
present dispute and our 1970 discussion.
In the 1970 paper we were concerned with the possibility that there might be more than one way
to evaluate the evidence favoring an entire tree by combining counts of the apomorphies for each of
its groups. As our discussion of explanatory ability implies, we now understand that our misgivings
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were groundless. Since parsimony aims to apply every similarity as synapomorphy, accepting an
interpretation of convergence only when this is unavoidable, the total of similarities applied as syn-
apomorphy for the entire tree is made as great as possible. But we had not yet realized this in 1970,
and so we did not claim then that the weight of evidence principle by itself entailed the parsimony
criterion.
But even if this principle were indeed consistent with more than one method, it need not be consistent
with every method. Clique methods do not apply as many apomorphic similarities as possible as
synapomorphies. The entire point of Duncan's procedure is that some characters, such as his trait 7,
that appear to be applicable as synapomorphies are nonetheless to be rejected. The weight of evidence
principle, then, clearly rules out clique methods. As we put it before, since parsimonious trees apply
more apomorphic similarities as synapomorphies than do clique trees, their groupings are better-
founded according to Hennig's principle.
Duncan offersnothing that could be construed as a reply to that observation, and so it would appear
that his insistent accusation of arbitrary reasoning is just another of his attempts at evasion. He would
no doubt maintain that only unique derivations should be counted in determining which groupings
are better founded. But we have already seen that Hennig does not restrict synapomorphies to unique
derivations in Duncan's sense, and thus Duncan's preference for clique methods has no foundation
in Hennig's work.
Duncan is not alone in misconstruing our 1970 comments on the weight of evidence principle. In
that paper we introduced the WISS method for calculating a tree from a matrix of numbers of
apomorphies shared by pairs of taxa. It operates much like a conventional agglomerative clustering
algorithm, grouping the pair of taxa that share the largest number of apomorphies, replacing those
taxa with an inferred stem species having all the apomorphies common to the pair, and repeating this
process until a complete hierarchy is formed. We suggested that the WISS method applies the weight
of evidence principle stepwise, by selecting at each clustering stage the possible group that shares the
greatest number of apomorphies.
Dahlgren and Rasmussen (1983) published that same technique, describing it as having been "orig-
inally described by Hennig (1950, 1966, 1969)." That is certainly a misattribution, for nothing in
Hennig's works resembles our (or Dahlgren and Rasmussen's) discussion of similarity matrices and
agglomerative clustering algorithms. Much more importantly, this method does not always conform
to Hennig's principles. We were careful to point out in 1970 that this approach cannot generally apply
secondary plesiomorphies as apomorphies, and so can be used only when reversals of character
evolution can safely be ruled out. Irreversibility scarcely obtains in general, and we have already taken
note of cases in which Hennig himself applied both gains and secondary losses of structures as
synapomorphies. A secondary plesiomorphy is a type of apomorphy, and so a method that is unable
to apply it as such violates both Hennig's auxiliary and weight of evidence principles.
Dahlgren and Rasmussen mentioned none of this, nor did they provide any defense of the irrevers-
ibility premise that underlies the method they advocated. It would appear that, having settled on that
model for reasons known only to themselves, they elected to defend it not by relevant argument but
by passing the method off as Hennig's. In that respect their way of proceeding bears an unfortunate
resemblance to Duncan's.
Since Duncan appealed to Felsenstein as an authority on Hennig's principles, it is perhaps pertinent
to take note of Felsenstein's own attitudes concerning Hennig.
"I find it impossible to tell from a reading of Hennig whether he would have preferred parsimony to
compatibility." (Felsenstein, 1983b: 323)
"Hennig had no recommendation for resolving incompatibilities beyond restudying the organisms in
the hope that the incompatibility will prove to be the result of misscored data." (Felsenstein, 1984:
170)
"Hennig's method works only as long as there is no internal conflict in the data." (Felsenstein, 1982:
381)
"[Hennig's method] is based on the further assumption that each derived state has arisen only once,
and that it is impossible for a character having a derived state to return to the ancestral state, evolution
being irreversible in these characters." (Felsenstein, 1982: 380)
The first of these passages may explain why Duncan quotes no further from Felsenstein, but otherwise
Felsenstein's claim shows nothing but disregard of Hennig's work. In all of these papers Felsenstein
considers only the "primary" type of clique method, in which (unlike Duncan's method) the characters
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used as synapomorphies are required to be literally uniquely derived. There is no doubt whatever that
Hennig would reject such a method, for in all the cases we have cited he applies multiply-derived
traits as synapomorphies. Those studies of Hennig's, in fact, apply traits that show not only multiple
derivation, but secondary loss (reversal), and-most assuredly-"internal conflict" (incompatibilities),
all the conditions that Felsenstein portrays as rendering Hennig's method inapplicable. Felsenstein's
version of Hennig's only way of resolving incompatibilities, finally, implies the canard that Hennig
believed the lack of teeth in birds, the endothermy of mammals, and the lack of wings in fleas to be
"misscored data."
But it was never Felsenstein's intention to study Hennig's work. Rather he aimed to create by these
comments the impression that Hennig's principles offer no solution to practical problems. His purpose
in this was to win acceptance for his view that methods for phylogenetic inference can only be derived
as statistical procedures from stochastic evolutionary models. How he applies that view we have
already seen.
Duncan contends that parsimony violates Hennig's auxiliary principle, arguing again from his (1984:
fig. 2) artificial data set. For those data the clique tree postulates unique derivations in characters a
and b, while characters x and yare excluded as convergent. The parsimonious tree also provides a
unique derivation for character a, and it applies characters x, y, and bas synapomorphies, though not
as unique derivations. "Why reject character b in this way," Duncan complains, "when for characters
a and b we can continue to assume that the joint possession of apomorphies in each is due to common
ancestry?"
Since character a has the same interpretation on both trees, it is not relevant to choosing between
them. Duncan's argument on character b is only another instance of his claim that Hennig would
apply only unique derivations as synapomorphies. The parsimonious tree does apply character b;
Duncan terms that character rejected only because it is not uniquely derived. Conversely he feels free
to reject x and y entirely, not because of the auxiliary principle, but just because they are not uniquely
derived. Since Hennig does not restrict synapomorphies to unique derivations, Duncan's argument
lacks any legitimate basis in Hennig's principles.
Churchill et al. (1985) pointed out how the auxiliary principle bears on their disagreement with
Duncan concerning the analysis of the imaginary dendrogrammaceae data set of Duncan et al. (1980).
That Duncan's argument on the auxiliary principle amounts just to his claim that only unique deri-
vations may be synapomorphies can be seen even more clearly in his reaction to their comments.
Duncan's clique tree (fig. 7 of Duncan et al.) differs from the parsimonious tree of Churchill et al.
just in the placement of taxon 8. In Duncan's tree that taxon and the group (7, 11, 16) each arise
separately from the root, as do three other groups whose treatment is not disputed. In the parsimonious
tree taxon 8 is instead grouped with those three taxa so that (7, 8, 11, 16) is one of four groups that
spring separately from the root. The apomorphic state of character II is common to those taxa although
it occurs in others as well. Duncan's tree requires that apomorphy to originate independently in taxon
8 and in (7, 11, 16), whereas the parsimonious tree is able to apply that trait as a synapomorphy of
(7,8, II, 16).
The change from Duncan's to the parsimonious tree does not require the interpretation of any
character other than 11 to be altered, so that no other characters are pertinent to choosing between
the two trees. The requirements of the auxiliary principle, quoted above, are then quite clear. The
apomorphic similarity in character 11 between taxon 8 and (7, 11, 16) is to be taken as synapomorphy
unless there are grounds for regarding it as symplesiomorphy or convergence.
Duncan does not maintain that that point of similarity is symplesiomorphy, He does point out that
the apomorphic state of character II is found in taxa outside (7, 8, II, 16). "Thus," he contends,
"there are no characters that define this group." That character does satisfy the criterion that Duncan
uses to dismiss his trait 7 as convergence rather than synapomorphy. But it has already been seen
that Duncan's criterion does not agree with Hennig's own evaluation of such characters as endothermy
and lack of compound eyes. There are then no legitimate grounds for considering the apomorphic
similarity between taxon 8 and (7. 11, 16)as convergence, and the clique tree plainly violates Hennig's
auxiliary principle.
Duncan's insistence that a group have defining characters gives the impression that he has confused
phylogenetic analysis with making keys, although perhaps he only means that synapomorphies must
be unique. Hennig's attitude on that idea is well illustrated by his (1981: 102) comment on the derived
characters of Diplura: "These also occur in other groups but have apparently arisen independently."
Whatever the reason for Duncan's demand for defining traits may actually be, it is certainly not
Hennig's views.
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Duncan (1984: 702) also objected that "A [clique] of 15 characters support the placement of taxon
8 as a monotypic lineage arising from the root of the cladogram." According to Hennig's principles,
however, only shared apomorphies provide evidence on grouping. Of the characters in Duncan's
clique, only 9 and 18 show an apomorphic state in taxon 8, and that is the only taxon that shows
those apomorphies, so that the similarities between taxon 8 and other taxa in the characters of the
clique are all symplesiomorphies. Duncan thus disputes the apomorphic similarity between taxon 8
and (7, 11, 16) in character lion the utterly irrelevant grounds that those taxa share the plesiomorphic
states of other characters. One might just as well deny the kinship of frogs and salamanders on the
pretext that both groups lack wings and feathers.
Finally, Duncan contends that Wagner's groundplan-divergence analysis gives the same tree for the
dendrogrammaceae as does Duncan's clique method. If this were true it would imply that Kluge and
Farris (1969) were wrong in attributing to Wagner the procedure that they described for calculating
most parsimonious trees.
In support of this claim Duncan maintains that Wagner himself prepared Duncan's "groundplan-
divergence" tree. He also cites a passage in which Wagner (1984: 115) discusses building a tree by
using unique derivations first, applying other characters later. Duncan takes that procedure to be "the
same as using synapomorphies in Hennig's sense," by which of course he means that it is a clique
method.
While superficially reasonable (indeed Farris, 1985, also took some of Wagner's 1984 comments to
suggestcliques) that interpretation scarcely follows. Camin and Sokal (1965) also tried adding multiple
derivations to a tree initially based on characters thought to have little homoplasy, and it was certainly
their aim to achieve a parsimonious arrangement. Wagner's proposal, that is, describes a computational
strategy, not a goal. Indeed, Wagner (1984: 102)characterizes his trees as having "nodes and internodes
placed most parsimoniously." Duncan does not mention this, nor does he comment on the quotations
from Wagner (1980: 183, 186, 187) that Churchill et al. (1985: 127-128) advanced as evidence of
Wagner's use of parsimony and non-unique derivations.
But it is unnecessary to debate the meaning of Wagner's comments when one may simply ask
Wagner himself. When we did so, he assured us that he does not agree with Duncan's treatment of
trait 7, and that, while his method may not be unerringly effective for this purpose, his aim was always
to achieve a parsimonious tree. Imperfect efficacy hardly amounts to a difference in principle; that
method as described by Kluge and Farris is likewise less than certain to obtain the most parsimonious
arrangement. (More recent algorithms are reviewed by Luckow and Pimentel, 1985.)
Wagner continued that he had never prepared a groundplan-divergence diagram for the dendro-
grammaceae. Doing so, he explained, would have defeated the purpose of those data, which he had
devised to provide an opportunity for students to learn through their own efforts to apply phylogenetic
principles. The only such tree in Wagner's files seems to have been prepared by one of his teaching
assistants. In particular, Wagner pointed out, Duncan et al. (1980: 281) should not have described
the "groundplan-divergence" tree of that paper as "developed by Wagner." It would seem that Dun-
can's preference for cliques is no more based on Wagner's ideas than it is on Hennig's.
While Duncan's advocacy of clique methods rests on nothing but false portrayals of Hennig's and
Wagner's views, we nonetheless agree with Duncan's concluding remark that this exchange has served
an important purpose.
Cliques have often been put forward as legitimate techniques of phylogenetic analysis and as em-
bodying Hennig's principles in particular (for reviews see Farris and Kluge, 1979; Farris, 1983), but
the grounds for those claims have always been vague, and so difficult to evaluate. It was never explained
specifically how Hennig's ideas were supposed to lead to cliques, nor were the assumptions of those
methods stated clearly. Duncan's paper at last provides explicit answers to both questions. Cliques
are based on the supposition that the warm-bloodedness of birds somehow implies that each kind of
mammal gained that condition independently, and the claim that they conform to Hennig's principles
is based on attributing that absurd premise to Hennig.
Hennig was far too great a systematist to deserve such calumny. We are glad to have had the
opportunity to refute it.
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TRADITIONAL METHODS IN TAXONOMY: A PERSONAL APPROBATION
While much has been written recently concerning new methodologies in plant taxonomy, the majority
of systematists still consider themselves traditionalists or, to use a term seemingly avoided these days,
alpha taxonomists. Throughout this essay the term "traditional" does not regress to the Linnaean
level of perception at which only taxa distinguishable with the naked eye are recognized. Indeed, many
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